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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THI•~ ~'JRNT NATIONAL BANK OF 
L<HlA~, OF LOGAN, UTAH, a 
National Banking Association, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
- vs -
\\'ALKER BANK & TRusrr COM-
l'AXY, a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
No. 10621 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
S'I'ATEl\lENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by appellant, a National 
Banking Association, for a declaratory judgment that 
thf' operation of certain drive-in and walk-up facilities 
(·onstruetPd hy respondent would be in violation of U.C.A. 
19;>~, 7-::3-G, as arnended, and for an injunction restraining 
ttRpondent from operating said drive-in and walk-up 
facilities. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
'I'he case was tried by the court and the court entered 
n .iudgmPnt in favor of respondent dismissing appellant's 
i·ornplaint and holding that the establishment and opera-
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tion of the drive-in and walk-up facilities constructed by 
respondent would not constitute the establishment of a 
branch bank within the meaning of U.C.A. 1953, 7-3-6, 
as amended, but would constitute only an extension and 
enlargement of respondent's Cache Valley Branch Bank. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the 
trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant is a National Bank with its main office 
at the southwest corner of the intersection of First North 
and Main Streets in Logan, Utah. Appellant also oper-
ates a branch at 442 North Main Street in the city (R. 64, 
Tr. 7), which is the subject matter of the litigation in 
Walker Bank & Trnst Compa;ny v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 90 
(10th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 34 U.S. Law Week, 3377 
(Mar. 3, 1966), No. 875. Respondent is a state bank having 
its main office a.t Salt Lake City, Utah, and a branch (the 
Cache Valley Branch) located at the northeast corner of 
the intersection of First North and Main Streets in 
Logan, Utah. 
The Cache Valley Branch was acquired by respond-
ent in 1956 as a result of a statutory merger whereby the 
Cache Valley Banking Company was merged with and 
into Walker Bank & Trust Company. At the time of the 
merger respondent did not acquire the ownership of the 
real property on which the banking business was con-
ducted. However, in December of 1964 it became the 
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owll<'l' in fpe simple of all of the land and buildings shown 
on Exhibit "2 '' ( R. 17 and R. 64, Tr. 8), including the 
land on which the drive-in and walk-up facilities in 
qurstion are located, subject only to the 12 foot right of 
way shown on said Exhibit (Ibid.). 
The portion of the building marked "A" on Exhibit 
"2" was occupied at the time of the trial by Utah Mort-
gage Loan Corporation but arrangements had been made 
for it to vacate so that the entire premises would be 
oecupied by respondent for banking purposes. The ex-
pansion was required by respondent due to the over-
crowded conditions and to provide better services for 
the cm;tomers at its Cache Valley Branch. (R. 64, Tr. 20-
~2). ~While the record does not so show, the entire 
premises are now occupied by respondent and used for 
hanking purposes. 
1'1w drive-in and walk-up facilities in question are 
f'hown on the photographs, Exhibits 3, 4 and 5 (R. 17, 
'rr. 21-22). They are located on the land owned by 
n•spondent immediately east of the 12 foot right of 
way, and the nearest of the two drive-in and walk-up 
faeilitit>s is 14 feet 6 inches east of the easterly wall of 
the main building (R. 17, Ex. 2). At the time of the 
trial the facilities had not been placed in operation but 
Owy were then connected to the main building by means 
of pneumatic tubes, and it was testified that upon com-
]lletion of the remodeling of the main building the tubes 
would he extended to the first teller's cage in the main 
building. (R. 64, Tr. 23). The testimony shows that at 
the time the facilities were to be put in operation, deposits 
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made at the facilities, together with the deposit slips, 
would h(' trans111ittPd through the tubes to the firnt 
telll:'r's cage in the 111ain building and funds used in tltt· 
facilitil:'s for paying withdrawals and cashing checks 
would be sent from that cage through the tubes to the 
facilities. (R 64, Tr. 23-2-l). Although the record dol's 
not so show, the pro,jected remodeling, including the 
extension of the pneumatic tubes has been completed, 
and the facility is presently in operation according to 
plan. These facts show that the operation of the facilities 
is connected with and a part of the branch operation. 
Neither the Utah State Banking Commissioner nor 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
has granted any authority to respondent to operate the 
drive-in and walk-up facilities. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE PROPOSED DRIVE-IN AND WALK-UP FACIL-
ITIES OF RESPONDENT DO NOT CONSTITUTE A 
BRANCH BANK WITHIN THE MEANING OF U.C.A. 
1953, 7-3-6, AS AMENDED. 
Since Logan is a city of the second class the opera-
tion of an additional branch in that city by respondent 
would be prohibited by U.C.A. 1953, 7-3-6, as amended, 
·which provides in part: 
Except in cities of the first class, or within un-
incorporated areas of a county, in which a city 
of the first class is located, no branch bank shall 
be established in any city or town in which is 
located a bank or banks, state or national, regu-
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la rly t rans:wt i ng a (·nstornar:• ban king business, 
nnlPss tht• hank SP<>king to establish such branch 
:-:!tall tah ovPr an existing bank. 
'l'lw sole q1wstion 1n·esPnted in this case is whether 
tlie OJH'rntion b~· n·spondPnt of tlw drivP-in and walk-up 
fa<'ilit i(•:-: in qtwstion eonstitutPs the establishment of a 
liran('h hank as that knn is defined in U.C.A. 1953, 7-3-6, 
a:" m11Pnd<·d, or whether the operation of said facilities 
('()Jlstitut<•s merel~- an extt>nsion or enlargement of re-
spondl'11t 's Pxisting branch. 'rhe term branch bank is 
dd'irn•d in the> above statute as follows: 
1'hP term 'branch' as used in this act shall be held 
to include any branch bank, branch office, branch 
agency, additional office or any branch place of 
lmsiness at which dPposits ar<:> received or checks 
paid or mon<:>y l<:>nt. 
Respondent contends that the operation of the proposed 
facilities represents a mere extension or enlargement 
of its existing branch and does not constitute the estab-
fo~hment of an additional branch bank. 
(A) OPIN"TOXS OF THE ATTORNEYS GEN-
l~RAL OI<-, UTAH AND OTHER STATES 
Sl rpp()RT RESPONDENT'S POSITION. 
11lw Attorne~· General of the State of Utah has 
i1•rnl('n•<l an opinion, No. 66-025, dated March 25, 1966, 
at t liP request of thP Ftah State Bank Commissioner. 
'J'l1is opinion states that a drive-in facility similar to the 
1hin-in and walk-up facilities of respondent would not be 
:1 liranch within the meaning of Section 7-3-6. A copy 
of his opinion, a copy of the letter referred to therein, 
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and a ('Opy of related doeuments ar<> sPt forth m thP 
appendix to this hrief. 
'l'he Attorney General concluded that such a facility 
was a part of the main bank because of the physical 
connection between the two by means of the pneumatic 
tube through which the money and documents would vass 
back and forth. His reasoning in that opinion is applic-
able to the case now before the court. Respondent':; 
drive-in facilities at the time of the trial were connected 
to the main building by pneumatic tubes, and the evidencr 
further shows that upon the completion of the remodel-
ing and the expansion of the facilities at the branch the 
tube would be extended to the first teller's cage and 
deposits made at the facilities would be transmitted to 
the teller's cage through thf' tuhes, and funds used in the 
facilities for paying withdrawals- and cashing checks 
would be transmitted from said teller's cage through 
said tubes. (R. 64, Tr. 23-24). 
Appellant has set forth opinions of the attorneys 
general of fourteen other states in its brief and states 
that respondent's facilities tnary have been a branch 
according to nine of these opinions. However, a review 
of these opinions, which were ref erred to in respondent's 
trial brief in the case below, reveal that thirteen of 
the fourteen opinions concluded that the drive-in facilitiP~ 
involved did not constitute branches and the remaining 
opinion (Appellant's Brief at 22.) states that a facility 
which is separated by more than an alley and which is 
not adjacent to the main banking house is prohibited. 
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In ap1wllant's analysis of th<· ovinions of the attor-
rwys general r<:>f{'rred to above (Appellant's Brief at 28.) 
and in appellant's statement of facts (Appellant's Brief 
at :1.) reference is made to the occupancy of a portion 
of respondent's premises by a separate business estab-
lishm{'nt. lt is stated on page 28 of Appellant's Brief 
th.at n•spondent's facilities would be a branch in the State 
of lllinois because they are separated from the main 
building by an intervening business establishment. On 
page :3 of said brief appellant states that there is no 
prohibition against leasing the offices which were occu-
pied by the separate business to others after the drive-in 
facilities are open for business by respondent. In these 
argmn{'nts appellant ignores Finding of Fact No. 5 
( R. 50) whieh states that the business occupying a portion 
of the respondent's building between the banking opera-
tion and the proposed facilities will be vacated by the 
<·orporation occupying it and will be occupied by respond-
(•11t at or about the time the operation of the facilities 
c·mrunPnC{'S. ln addition, the trial court in its memoran-
dm11 decision, dated March 14, 1956 (R. 64, Tr. 35) im-
pmwd thP condition that the intervening business estab-
lishnwnt be moved out and that all signs and marks 
indicating the presence of it be removed so that there 
would remain no intervening business operating between 
thP main building and the proposed facilities. It must 
hP assmned that the respondent will comply with the 
11>\\'<'r eourt's order in this regard, and, in fact, the above 
l'P'lnirenwnts of the trial court have already been accom-
plislwd. 
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(B) CA8E8 I1'ROl\l OTHER .J l1RISDIC'l'ION~ 
HAVE DEALT WI'l'll THE ISSFl1~ 0~' 
\VHE'l'HER DRl VI~-lN F ACILITU~S AIU~ 
BRANCHES. 
'rhen' are no Utah cases dealing with the issue of 
whether or not driw-in and walk-up facilities at a hank 
constitute a branch hut cases have heen decided in othPr 
jurisdictions dt>aling with this issue. In J.llichiqan Nn-
tional Bank v. Saxon, Civil No. 821-62, D. D.C., July 2G, 
1962, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that a 
drive-in facilitv five hundred feet distant from the 
establislmi1~ branch \Yas not an additional branch but 
merely a part of or an extension of the existing branch. 
In deciding that the facility was not an additional branch, 
the court referrc>d first to the definition of the term 
"branch" as defined in Rev. Stat.~ 5155 (:1875), 12 lT.f.l.C. 
~ 36(f), which is identical in wording to the Utah statute 
defining branch and in an unpublished opinion, a copy 
of which is found in the record of this case (R. 30-36), 
stated: 
The only possible phrase that could apply to 
the drive-in facility involved in this case is tlw 
phrase 'additional ~ff ice.' It does not mean, ho\\·-
ever, that every time a bank rents an additional 
room or additional offices in another building, a~ 
hanks do sometimes when their business Pxpands, 
that they are opening a new hraneh, the word:-; 
'additional office' must be reasonabl v construed 
as meaning a separate and independent office. 
operating in the same way as branch bwnks gen-
erally operate, and not merely additional office 
space to an existing facility. 
Here we have a small structure eonnedPd by 
a pneumatic tube and operating as part of the 
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(Jrn11r:li 1ww e.risti11q. lt se(•Jlls unn·asonahle to the 
('ourt to call that a separate branch. (Emphasis 
added.) (R. 33-34) 
ApJH"llant in his brief on page 7 cites Continental 
H1111/,· & Trust Co. r. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 370, 384 P.2d 796 
(1 ~163), as authority for the proposition that the holding 
and language of the Michigan National Bank case is in-
applicahk to the case before the court. The Continental 
(•a;;e hPh1 that the making of loans hy banks through in-
:~nranee ageuts who prepared the necessary documents 
for such loans which were then forwarded by said agents 
to the bank was in violation of Section 7-3-6. These loans 
\\'ne 1wgotiated either'' at the office or home of the agent 
or t hP office or home of the customer or even upon the 
,;tn'et." 14 Utah 2d at 376, 384 P.2d at 800. The facts 
in that ('USP are in no way comparable to the facts in the 
in;;tant c·as<>. The Attorney General of Utah in Opinion 
:\' n. f)(i-025, supra, distinguishes the Continental case from 
a va:-:<· involving a drive-in facility. 
In Jackson v. First National Bank, 246 F. Supp. 134 
I ~l.D. Ga. 1965), the court held that a drive-in facility 
2~HJ.;)7 fret distant from the main building in no way 
1·onnPdPd to the main building other than by telephone 
and s<·paratPd from the main building by ten buildings 
('ontaining husinessPs and hy an allt>y, was a branch bank. 
.\ppPllnnt in its brief on pages 11 and 12 states that 
thr rourt in the Jackson case said that a lack of a pneu-
111ati<' tnlw made no difference in its decision and that 
t Jii. eonrt did not eonsidPr a tu he a physical connection. 
('(Intra r>· to these inferPnce;;: in Appellant's Brief, the 
1 (1nrt :-:ai<l thP lll'E'SPBCP or ahsencr of a pneumatic tube 
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was 1wrhaps a r<'levant factor for considPration hut that 
the absence of ~mch a tnbP was not a controlling fact 
in the case muler considera.tion. It is clear that the ah-
sen('e of a pneumatic tube in a case where the proposed 
facility was as far removed from the main building 
as described above, would not be a significant additional 
fact. However, in the case before this court where a 
distance of only fourteen feet, six inches separates the 
facilities from the main building, where there are no 
intervening businesses and where the land is owned by 
respondent over which the intervening right-of-way is 
located, the presence of pneumatic tubes is important 
since it demonstrates that the facility is operated as part 
of the branch and that the two are physically connected. 
In State Clwrtered Banks in Washington v. Peoplri) 
National Bank, Civil No. 6338, W.D. Wash., February 28, 
1966, one of the issues decided by the court was whether 
a drive-in facility was a branch within the meaning of 
Rev. Stat. § 5155 (1875 ), 12 U.S.C. § 36(f). In deciding 
the issue, the court looked at the physical situation in-
volved and stated in an unreported memorandum decision 
that the "proposed facility is some 260 feet or more from 
the principal office, on a separate lot, in another block, 
across a busy thoroughfare, has a different address and 
is in a completely disconnected building. No stretching 
of the term 'additional office' is required at all to see it 
fits perfectly. The proposed facility is, therefore, a 
'branch' within the meaning of the federal statute.'' 
In Great Plains Life lnsuratnee Co. v. First National 
Bank, 316 S.W. 2d 98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), plaintiff 
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;;ought a court decree that its lease with defendant was 
voi<l on the ground, among others, that defendant was 
('onducting an illegal bank business on the leased premises 
herause of three tellers' windows located across an alley 
from the banking office. The tellers' windows were con-
Mcted to the banking office with pneumatic tubes and 
a tunnel. The court quoted the Texas banking code as 
follows: 
X o . . . bank shall engage in business in more 
than onf' plaC(', maintain any branch office, or 
eash clweks or receivt> deposits except in its own 
banking house. 
ln deciding for the defendant, the court said: 
As we understand a branch bank, it is a sep-
arate entity and deposits made in a branch bank 
an• payable there and only there unless the branch 
bank be cl.osed or demand for the payment by the 
dt>positor be refused, then demand for the pay-
ment will be against the mother bank. For con-
venienct> of its depositors three teller's windows 
were established to permit a depositor to drive 
in and make a deposit, and there is nothing in 
this record to show that the tellers of the drive-in 
portion of the bank had any more authority than 
any otlwr tellers in the bank building proper. 
'rhis drive in depository is nothing more than a 
part of the appellee bank. All deposits made at 
the tellers' windows are placed in appellee's bank. 
[ t is clear from the foregoing cases that in determin-
ing tht> issue of "~hether or not a drive-in facility is a 
hranrh bank the courts look primarily to the distance of 
thP drivt>-,in facilitit>s from the main building and to the 
physical eonnt>ction between the two. When close prox-
imity and a physical connection are found to exist, it 
11 
appearl' from tlw opinions of tlH• attorn<'ys g<·nPral and 
from tlw <·as<'s above citPd, that the drive-in facility is 
considert>d part of the lll'anch or an Pxtension or 1'11-
largernent tlwrPof. In eontrast to tlw fact situations pr1•-
1wntf'd in tlw Jackson and State Chartered Ba11ks i11 
Washington rases, the proposed facilities in this case are 
only fourteen feet, six inclws from the main building, 
are located on the sanw parcel of land owned by rPspond-
<->nt on which the remainder of the branch is operated and 
are connected to the main building by means of pneumati<· 
tubes. The trial court has also found that the facilities 
"will be operated as an integral part of the branch bank, 
both from the standpoint of operation and proximity 
to the main building,'' and that said operation "will pro-
vidf' more convenient services for [respondent's] rusto-
mers." ( R. 5-1-) 
(C) THE ADM1N8TRATIVE INTERPRETA-
TIOX OF THE STATFTORY DEFINITION 
OF THE ·woRD "BRANCH" IS THAT l'l' 
DOE~S NOT APPLY TO A DRIVl~-IN FACIL-
ITY CONNECTED -WITH AND IN CLOSI•; 
PROXIMITY TO AN I~XISTING BA~K OH 
BRANCH BANK. 
In Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Sen:ice Com-
mission, 107 Utah 155, 152 P .2d 542 ( 1944), this court 
stated: 
Consistent administrative interpretation~ 
over th<.' years h~- the offict'rs chargt>d with thP 
duty of applying the statute and making each 
part ·work efficiently and smoothly are entitled 
to p·eat weight li~- the conrts. (152 P.2d at 5rl7. l 
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All statP hanks an~ und<>r thP su1wrv1s10n of the 
.~tah· lianking departmPnt, P.C.A. 1953, 7-1-7, as amended, 
and t lw hank co1t11nissio1wr has the power to adopt rulPs 
and n·g-ulations in harmony with law to govt>rn the con-
dud, <>JH'ration and managenwnt of statP banks, U.C.A. 
rn::>:l, 7-1-..t-. rL'lw hank commissioner is also the officer 
<'barged with responsibility of granting or denying appli-
<'ations to Pstahlish branch hanks, U.C.A. 1953, 7-3-6, as 
(!l ! Wl1li<>d. 
'l'hP Comptroller of the Currency is vested with 
general administrative powers and duties for the admin-
istration of national banks and is charged \vith the duty 
of their supervision, Rev. Stat.§ 324(1875),12U.S.C.§1. 
H1• is also the officer charged with the duty of granting 
or dPTI)'ing applications for the establishment of branches 
h\· national hanks, Rev. Stat.§ 5155 (1875),12 U.S.C. § 36. 
SpPncer C. 'l'aylor, thP chief banking examiner of the 
l talt Stat!' Banking Department, the acting Bank Com-
lllissimwr in J 9GO and the Bank Commissioner 1961-
l 01i~>. tPstifit>cl that the drive-in facility at the principal 
offi<'P of the Continental Bank & Trust Company at Salt 
Lak(' City, lTtah, shown on a photograph marked Exhibit 
"(j" ( R. rn-17), has bt•en operating since July 27, 1960, 
tliat the drive-in facility of the Beehive State Bank at its 
111ain offiee in Salt Lah City, Utah, as shown on a 
1ilwtog-raph marked Exhibit ''7" (R. 16-17) has been 
ll\JPrating sinee October 9, 19Gl, and that the drive-in 
for·ilih" at tlw C01m11ercial Secmity Bank in Ogden at 
1t;: main offie<>, shown on a photograph marked as Ex-
lt:l1it "~" (H. lli-17) is 1·nnt>ntl)' lwing operatt>d in the 
13 
sa111P wanner as it has lH'Pll opC'rated sinee its establish-
ment (R. ()-!, Tr. :.W, 29, 30). He stated that the State 
Banking Departnwnt, whieh is aware of all the drive-in 
facilitie8 of tllP stat!, hanks in thP State of l Ttah has not 
granted authorit.'· to any of tlw above thrPe na11H•d banks 
for tl1P 01wration of the drive-in facilities shown on the 
exhihits (R. G+, Tr. 28, :30, 31 ). 
Dr. El Hoy X elson, Yic·(• Pn•sident and J<~conomist 
of First Seeurity ( 'orporation, testified that the Comp-
troller of tlw CmTPney has not given approval or gTanted 
authority for tltt· operation of the drive-in facilitiPs of 
First fiPcluit.'· Bank at +th South and Main Street in 
Salt Lake City, as shown on tlw photograph marked Ex-
hibit "1" (R. 16-17), for the drive-in faeilities at Provo, 
l~tah, whieh an~ 300 feet from the main building, nor 
for the drive-in facility at Brigham City, Ftah, which 
is s<:>parated from tht> main building by an abstract officr, 
a barlwr shop and a nineteen foot alley (R. (-i4, Tr. 18-19). 
He also frstified that First Security Bank is operating 
many drive-in facilities throughout the Statt> and that 
most of First SPcurit.'·'s offices in the Salt Lake arPa 
have Pither a present drive-in facility or one is undPr 
con::-;trnetion. X one of thesP facilities are operated pur-
suant to iwnuission or authority from the Comptroller 
of the Currency. (Ibid.) 
Aprwllant argues that a morP definitp statute dealing 
with drive-in facilities would protE~ct the banking com-
munit.'· from losing largt> capital investments in drive-
in facilities hecamw of now heing forced to s1wculatP 
whether drive-in facilitiPs will be allowed to operate 
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11n<·<· th<·.'· an· constnwfrd. ThP argu11H·nt ovPrlooks the 
ind that a deknnination h.'· this court that l'Pspondent's 
dr.w-in t'a<"ilitiPs in question an• a braneh would jeo-
11i11"liz<· the large inwshtwnt in driVf'-in facilities now 
J11·inµ; opPrah·d in this stah' which are comparable to the 
i':wilitiPs in qlwstion. 
( D) CO~ll\IOX USAGE AND PRACTICE UN-
DT,~R THE S'l1ATUTE IX QFJ1~STION SUP-
PORT RESPONDENT'S POSITION. 
l '01111110n usage and praetice under a statute are of 
:.:r<·at valrn~ in determining its meaning when a statute 
i,- arnhiguons. In ~2 C .. J.S. Statutes ~ 358, Practical 
l'nnstnwtion or Usage, it is said: 
< ln thP prineipal of contemporaneous Pxposi-
t i 011, common usage and practice under the stat-
1th•, or a course of conduct indicating a particular 
understanding of it, will frequently be of great 
rnhw in detPnnining its real meaning, especially 
\dt<'rP 1 hL• usagP has bePn acquiesced in by all 
partiPs concerned and has extended over a. long 
p<'riod of tinw. A practical construction of a 
statntP is not conclusive on the courts, but, if un-
varying for a long period of time, it should be 
disrPganh·d only for thE> most cogent rPasons. 
TIH• tt·stimon.'- n•ceived at trial from Dr. ElRoy 
\<·Ison of the First 8Pcnrity Bank and from Spencer 
Tarlor, the chief ha11king examiner of the State Banking 
llPparhuent with rPgard to the course of conduct of a 
l1anking co111mlmity undPr thP statute in question estah-
li,:l1<·s 1liat the ('Ollllnnnit.'·'s nndPrstanding of the irn•an-
111µ; of th<· :-:tatut<> mluld allow <lriv(•-in faeilities of th« 
natun· n·:-:pornl<·nt is now OJH_'l'ating in Logan. 'l1hat th<· 
hanking· eo11m1tmit:--· has adoptPd this understanding of 
tht~ lll<'aning· of th<> statnte for a long lH'riod of ti1ne i;-; 
evicl(•nc<•d h:--· thP nu111lwr of drin·-in faciliti<·s which now 
Pxist thrnughout the StatP of ·utah. 
Thi· 19::1:) LPgislatme in defining "branch" dealt 
with th<> situation as it thm existed. The State Bank 
Co11m1issi01wr and th<> Cornptrollt>r of t1w Currency havt> 
eonstnwcl thP statntP in light of presPnt day methods of 
transacting busin<'ss whidt have lPd to the common pra<·-
tiC'e of th<.> establis}nnent and operation of drive-in f'a-
ci litiPs h:--· tlw hanking co11mnmity. The reasons sup-
porting an affirmation by this eourt of the common usagP 
and pradie<> undPr this statute arP mon• compelling than 
any hypothetical situation that appdlant has set forth 
in support of its contention that this court should set 
asidP tlw lower court's ruling. 
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COXCLFSIOX 
'l'h<' l<~indings of Fad made by the lower court and 
tJH· t('stimony given at trial (•stablish that t1H• drive-in 
and walk-up fa<'ilities in question are a part of respon-
(knt's Logan branch bank and constitut(' a mere exten-
:-:ion or !'nlarg<'lllPnt of ~mid branch which will provide 
l 1vttn sP rviC't> to respondent's C'Ustomers. ThPrt>fore, the 
jndg111Pnt of the trial court should he affirmed since the 
1·:-;tablishment and operation by respondent of said facili-
ti1·" do not constitute thP (•stablishment of a "branch" 
liank \\'ithin tlw meaning of U.C.A. 1953, 7-3-6, as 
111l 1Pn<1Pd. 
Res1wctfully :,,;ubmitted, 
.Joseph S. Jone::.; 
W. Robert Wright 
HAY, RA VvLINS, JONES, 
& HENDERSON 
800 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
AttornPys for Respondfnt 
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A J>J>E);"DfX 
Opini011 of l "tah Attorney UenPral, );"o. lifi-0:25 and 
RelatPd Docmnents 
(H'T•'IC'E OF 'I'l-11•: A'l'TORXEY o~:xJ<~RAL 
S'l'A'l'E OF FTAH 
OPfNlOX OF LA"" 
X o. Gu-0:25 
Request!•d h~· \Y. S. Brimhall, Vtah State Bank Corn-
missiorn·r, 57-1- East SPcond South, Salt Lah City, Utah. 
Prepared hy Attonwy <lPnt-ral Phil L. Hansm and Staff. 
QCl•~STIOX 
::\lay a hank t>stablish driv-P-in facilitiPs for the 
cashing of checks, making deposits, and perform-
ing such banking functions as can be accomplished 
at a driw-in facility on property ownPd by tlw 
hank, but st>parated from the bank building by a 
drive\\·ay not owned by the bank, said drive-in 
facility and tlw bank building to be connected 
hy a p1wnmatie tube undf'r tlw drivevvay for c·on-
ve>·ing money and papt-rs back and forth, as well 
as television facilities "·hich will enable the cu~­
tomer and the teller in the hank to see and con-
vt'l'se with Pach other'? 
CONCLlTSION 
lHS. This ovinion is limited, however, to the fae-
tnal situation presentPd. 
OPIKJOX 
lTndt•r thP hanking lmrn of the State of lTtah, a bank 
ma>· conduct its business only at its hanking house. Any 
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ntlwr officf:s, ageneies, or places of husinPss at \\'hich a 
!Jank way receive deposits, pay checks, or loan money 
arP known as "branches." In order to establish a branch, 
a hank must follow a procedure set forth in the statutes 
in order to obtain a license from the State Bank Com-
rnission<"r for the establishment of the branch. Section 
7-3-G, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended (1963), 
provides in part: 
'fhe business of every bank shall be eonducted 
only at its banking house and every bank shall 
receive deposits and pay cheeks only at its bank-
ing house except as herf'inafter provided. 
\Vith the consent of the bank commissioner, 
any hank having a paid-in capital and surplus of 
not less than $60,000 may establish and orwrate 
one branch for the transaction of its business; 
provided, that for each additional branch estab-
lished there shall be paid in an additional $60,000 
(capital and surplus). 
The term "branch'' as used in this act shall 
be held to include any branch bank, branch office, 
branch agency, additional office, or any branch 
place of business at which deposits are received 
or checks paid or money lent. 
'L'Jw instant problem is to determine whether the 
proposed drive--in facility is a branch or a part of the 
hanking housP. 
It appears reasonably clear from thP abovP statutPs 
that thP proposed drive-in facility, if it were not con-
TH>dt>d to the hank building by a pneumatic tube and 
tPlevision, would be a branch. This was the effect of a 
ldt11r from thr Attorney General, State of Utah, to tlw 
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l·tah !--itatP Hank Cornrnissionn, datt>d Novemb<~r 8, 19;)7, 
in whi('h tlH· Attorney Cle1wral advised the Bank Com-
missioner that a driYP-in facility locatrd 14-1 fed from 
tlw bank hnilding was a branch hank. 
HO\n•wr, it seems that in this particular situation 
thP proposed driw-in facility would not constitute a 
hraneh, hut would he an integral part of tlw banking 
hons<'. ll<>n·, the hank building and thP clriw-in faeility 
are separah•d by a driVl'Wa>·, but they an• physically 
attaelwd, in a s<'nse, by tlw pnemnatic tube. The teller 
is locatPd in the hank building and tlw mone>· and docu-
nwnts pass haek and forth hetwef>n the customer and thf' 
tt>llt>r via tlw pnPmnatic tube. The customer and the teller 
ean talk with and set> each other by rneans of tPlevision. 
It appears more logical, under tht>se facts, to conclude 
that tlw driw-in facility is a part of the banking housf' 
ratlwr than a branch hank. 
Aside from the abovp conclusion that tlw proposed 
drive-in facilit>· is part of the banking house, it could 
lw persuasively argn<•d that tlw banking transaction ae-
tually takes place within the hank where the teller is 
located, thus mePting the requirements of Section 7-:3-fi, 
Utah Code Annotated, ] 953, quotc~d abow, that "the 
businPss of t>wry bank shall he conducted only at it~ 
banking house and PVPry bank shall receivP deposits and 
pay clwcks onl>· at its hanking house> ... " This situation, 
it appears, is distinguishable from tht> one in Continental 
Bank and Trust Company v. Taylor, 38-1- P.2d 796 (Utah 
1963), in whieh the Utah Supreme Court held that tlw 
making· of loans by a bank through insurancf> agents who 
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prt>parNl t hl' rn·<·<·;,:sa r:- dof'unwnts for finanf'ing the sale 
(ii' :rntornohil<'s and immntn('(' tlwreon and tlwn forwarded 
:-;aid doem1wnb to tlw bank eonstitnt('d branch banking. 
Tlw basis of tlw <·<mrt's dPcision was that the transactions 
\\'<'l'\' <'OJll}Jl<'t<>d by thp insurance agPnts, who were agents 
of th<> hank, outside of tht> banking hous<>. The court said: 
\Ve e<msider tlw transaction completC'd and 
the morn•y "lent" at the time ( 1) the executed note 
and mortgage are delivf:'red to the representative 
of thP Bank, and whether he is an insurance agent 
and whether or not he is paid by the Bank are 
i1111uaterial factors, and ( 2) the customer is au-
thorized by tlw Bank to draw checks thereon. 
From tlw foregoing rationale, it is concluded that 
it \\'OU kl not he unlawful for the propost>d drive-in fa-
1·ilit:· to he constrnctr>d and operated in the manner de-
~<·rihed in tl10 <gwstion. This opinion, however, is limited 
to th<• partici1lar factual situaton presented. 
Dated this 25th day of March, 1966. 
l'LH/hwv/bp 
RespPctfully submitted, 
Attornt>y GPneral Phil L. Hansen 
[signed] 
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SPHJX(J\'JLLE lL\XKIX<l CO. 
EstahliHhed 1891 
.T ul~· 1 ti. 1 ~1:l7 
Mr. 8Pth Young-
8tate Hank Connnissiorn'r 
State Capitol 
Salt Lak<> Cit~·. l~tah 
Dear ~l'th: 
I all\ Pndosing a rtah Count~· Plats Plan of Block 
12 Plat "A'', Springville City. 
You will notiee in this plat that our Bank Building 
i.s on tlw rig-ht-hand corn(-lr and from marked point "A" 
thl' W(-lst corner of our building to marked point "B" the 
east point of our propert~· now used as a parking lot i~ 
141.25 frd. Our plan is to U:'-1<' tlw pro1wrty to tlw west 
of th(> hank lmilding- for a possihle dri.v(-l-in loeation and 
a possible sitP for onr saff' d1>posit vault. 
It was ~·our sugg(-lstion that I suhmit tlw i)lat HO 
that yon could tum it over to thf' Attornl'~· General to 
see 'Yheth<>r sueh a plan would comply with th<> hanking 
laws of th(> Stat(' of Ptah. 
FCP:c· 
encl 
Yours V(-lry truly, 
/s/ F. C. Packard 
President 
[A copy of the plat referred to in this and the follow-
ing letters is reproduced on the fold-out, inside ha<'l, 
cover.] 
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July 18, 1957 
11 onorabl<• g. R. Callister 
State of Utah 
Capitol Building 
Dl'ar ~lr. Callister: 
One of our state-chartered banks has inqnirPd of us 
as to whether or not it would be possible to use the 
property to the west of its building for a drive-in location 
and a possible site for a safe deposit vault. 
A copy of the letter is attached for your further in-
formation. 
Will you please give me your opinion on the above 
matter. 
~HY :rnrn 
Ene. 
Very truly yours, 
/s/ Seth H. Young 
Bank Commissioner 
AJ:,;o enclosed is a Utah County Plats Plan of Block 12 
Plat ''A'', Springville City, which please return to this 
office. 
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).'" OVPJlllH•r 8, 1937 
Seth H. Y onng 
Bank l'o111111issimwr 
Buikling 
D<>ar Mr. Young: 
Yon havp asked whdher a state bank may open a 
"drive-in., location l.:tl feet from its main banking house 
without complying with tlw provisions of the Utah law 
relating to branch banks. In my opinion, such question 
must he answered in tlw ne>gative, and I have heretofor<' 
verbally expre>ssed this view to officials of the bank 
concerned. HowevPr, in order to confirm this previom; 
conversation, I submit tlw following for your consider-
ation. 
Section 7-8-G, F.C.A. 1953, as amendt>d, provides in 
part: 
The lmsi11ess of every bank shall lJe conducted 
mily at its ba·nking ho11se and e1.:cry lwnk shall re-
ceive drposits a11d pay checks only at its banking 
house except as hereinafter provided. 
·with the consent of the bank commissioner 
and the approval of the governor, any bank having-
a paid-in capital and surplus of not less than $60,-
000 may (•stablish and opPrate one branch for th(' 
transaction of its business; provided, that [for] 
Pach additional hran('h established there shall bL· 
paid in an additional $GO,OOO (capital and sur-
plus). 
The term "branch" as used in this act shall 
be held to include any bramch bank, branch offfrf, 
bra.nch agency, additional office, or any branch 
place of business at ichich deposits are receiced 01 
checks paid or money lent. 
24 
,\11~· hank desiring to 1•stahlish on\' or more 
branches or offices shall file a written application 
tlwn·for in such form and containing such infor-
niation as the hank commissioner may require. 
X o hank shall he permitted to establish any branch 
or office until it shall first have been shown to 
tlH• satisfaction of the hank commissioner and the 
gowrnor that the puhlie convenience and advan-
tage will he suhsf'rved and prornotf'd by the es-
tablislmH'nt of such hranch of [or] office and the 
hank eommissioner may by order permitting the 
PstahlishrnPnt of such branch or office designate 
and limit the character of work and service which 
n1ay tlwrein he pt>rfornwd. (J<~mphasis added.) 
ln my opinion, tht> vropospd drive-in location is so 
~q1arat('d from the banking house that it is a branch 
l1:rnk, hraneh offiee, hranch agency or additional office 
within the contemplation of Section 7-3-6, supra. There-
i'11rP, tl1P provisions gowrning the branching of hanks 
\'. 11111<1 lH' appli<·ahlc> and the state hank in question may 
11 11t l'stahlish thP drive-in faeility without making formal 
applieation for a branch and otherwise complying with 
tiH• l'tah law, particularly 8f'etion 7-3-6, U.C.A. 1953, 
:1~ nlllPlH}ed. 
Y ery truly yours, 
RAYMOXD \V. GEE 
Assistant Attonwy General 
Q 
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